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The CHSH-protocol generates secret key from correlations that violate the CHSH-inequality suf-
ficiently much. In this paper, a security proof against general attacks is provided for this protocol.
The only assumption made in the proof is that the information accessible to any eavesdropper must
be compatible with the impossibility of signalling. This results provide a secure key distribution
scheme in situations where the honest parties distrust their apparatuses. The techniques developed
for the proof are fairly generic, so that also other entanglement-based protocols can be proved secure
by modifying the details. We also analyze a variant of the CHSH-protocol, which yields higher key
rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
In entanglement-based protocols for Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) [1], two honest parties (Alice and
Bob) sharing EPR pairs [2] can obtain a secure key by
performing measurements. They can also certify that
they have EPR pairs by observing sufficiently strong
violations of Bell’s inequalities [3]. When the EPR
pairs are noisy, measurements only provide partially
secret correlations. Then, in order to obtain perfect se-
cret bits, the parties must perform a secret-key distilla-
tion procedure, with the assistance of local operations
and public communication (LOPC) [4, 5]. A necessary
step before implementing this procedure is to estimate
how secret their correlations are. In other words, how
much information about their outcomes an eavesdrop-
per (Eve) has, in the worst case scenario. This is done
by exploiting the monogamy of entanglement, which
imposes tradeoffs between Alice-Bob entanglement and
Eve’s correlation with them [6].
One way of estimating the degree of entanglement
they share is by performing quantum tomography to
their states [7]. But for doing so, they have to assume
that the quantum systems they measure belong to a
state space of a particular dimension d (usually two).
This assumption, though strong, is usually not men-
tioned in the presentations of QKD. It implies that the
honest parties must trust their apparatuses (see [8] for
a detailed discussion).
A framework to analyze quantum correlations with-
out caring about the dimension d is to consider them
as, simply, non-signalling correlations [9, 10]. This fol-
lows from the assumption that no measuring process
can be used to send information between distant loca-
tions. Clearly, this is a much relaxed assumption com-
pared to quantum mechanics. Within this framework,
one can forget about the origin of the correlations, it
does not matter which kind of system is measured, and
in particular, what is its dimension d. It is shown in [9]
that, as long as the obtained correlations violate some
Bell inequality, there is some degree of privacy in them
– in the sense that secret key is needed to create the
correlations.
The first protocol secure against a non-signalling Eve
was presented in [10]. Unfortunately, the security proof
provided, only works when the secret key rate is zero.
More recently, the CHSH-protocol has been introduced
in [8], and has the advantage of being easy to imple-
ment with present-day technology. A security proof
against individual attacks was provided in [8]. Here, we
prove its security against completely general attacks.
We also analyze a variant of the CHSH-protocol, the
π/3-protocol, which yields higher key rates. We give a
detailed explanation of the security proof for this pro-
tocol, because it is simpler. To extend this proof to the
CHSH-protocol, we just mention how to modify it.
In section II we introduce the framework and explain
the main results. In section III the π/3-protocol is de-
tailed, and its security is proven in section IV. In sec-
tion V we analyze the CHSH-protocol, and section VI
is devoted to the discussion of the results.
II. DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS
Suppose that Alice and Bob shareN pairs of physical
systems, labelled by n = 1, . . .N . Alice measures her
nth system with one among two observables, denoted
by Xn = 0, 1, obtaining the outcome An = 0, 1. The
outcomes and the observables for all systems are repre-
sented by the random variables A = (A1, . . . AN ), B =
(B1, . . . BN ), X = (X1, . . .XN ) and Y = (Y1, . . . YN ),
which are correlated according to the probability dis-
tribution PAB|XY . The number PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) is
the probability of obtaining the strings of outcomes
a, b ∈ {0, 1}N when measuring x, y ∈ {0, 1}N . Consider
the marginal distribution for Alice’s two first systems
PA1A2|X1X2 . The non-signalling assumption imposes
that the choice of observable in one site cannot modify
the marginal distribution for the outcome in the other
site, for instance PA2|X1X2 = PA2|X2 [9].
We quantify the non-locality of a 2N -partite distri-














f [an + bn + xnyn]
)
, (2)
where f [m] = 1 if m is even, and f [m] = 0 if m is odd.
The bound for local variable models [9] is
B[P lvmAB|XY ] ≥ 1 , (3)
which for N = 1 is equivalent to the CHSH-inequality
[11]. Therefore, the smaller B[PAB|XY ], the more non-
local PAB|XY .
We assume that the only information accessible to
Eve is the outcome E obtained when measuring a cor-
related physical system with an observable Z. We im-
pose that the global distribution PABE|XY Z is non-
signalling. When tracing over Eve, the marginal for





for all values of Z. Hence, an attack can be seen as a
preparation of PAB|XY by means of a particular mix-
ture. In principle, Eve can choose any mixture (4), and
the decision can be made whenever she wants. Without
loss of generality, she makes this decision at the end of
the protocol, depending on the public communication.
In particular, if Eve knows the hashing function G that
outputs the final key, the decomposition (4) can depend
on G. This invalidates standard privacy amplification
schemes [4, 5], where the global distribution is fixed
while the average over G is made. Public information
reconciliation cannot be used neither, for the same rea-
son. To sort this out, we consider secret key expansion
instead of secret key generation: Alice and Bob initially
share a large enough secret key which is consumed dur-
ing the protocol, and at the end, they obtain a secret
key which is larger than the initial one. Usually, an
initial key is used to authenticate the public channel;
but here we go further: Alice sends part of the informa-
tion that Bob needs to correct his errors secretly, and
also, the hashing function which outputs the final key
is kept secret. In this scenario, the absolute amount
of generated secret bits is meaningless, and instead, we
consider the net gain of secret key.
Denote by PA1B1|X1Y1 the estimated distribution for
a single pair of systems. It will be shown that the
asymptotic (net) secret key rate attainable with the
π/3-protocol is
R = − logB[PA1B1|X1Y1 ]−H(A1|B1, X1=Y1=0), (5)




PAB(a, b) logPA|B(a|b). (6)














FIG. 1: The rate for the CHSH-protocol is the dotted line,
the rate for the pi/3-protocol is the continuous line (general
attacks) and the dashed line (individual attacks).
Of course, the entropy depends on the underlying dis-
tribution P , so whenever there might be ambiguity, we
attach P as a subscript, e.g. H(X |Y )P . Let us remark
that the conditional entropyH(A1|B1, X1=Y1=0) con-
tains an average over B1, like in (6), but is conditioned
on the event X1 = Y1 = 0, not meaning any average.
The function B and the rate formula corresponding to
the CHSH-protocol are slightly different than (1) and
(5). The rates obtained by optimally measuring a noisy
EPR pair
Φµ = (1 − µ)Φ + µ I
4
, (7)
where Φ is the projector onto |00〉+ |11〉, are plotted in
the figure, for both protocols.
The strongest notion of security in cryptography is
the so called universally composable security. One calls
a cryptographic primitive (for instance key distribu-
tion) universally composable, if it is secure in any arbi-
trary context [12]. The security that we show is not uni-
versally composable, but of the same kind as in QKD
before the publication of [12]. We show the following:
suppose that Eve chooses the input Z = z at the end of
the protocol, obtaining the outcome E. Denote by E′
all the information available to Eve, which includes E
as well as all public messages exchanged by the honest
parties. Let K and K ′ be the keys obtained respec-
tively by Alice and Bob, and let PKK′E′|Z=z be the
global distribution. Denote by PU the uniform distri-
bution over the same alphabet as K. It is shown that,
for any ǫ > 0
Prob{K 6= K ′} ≤ ǫ (8)
‖PUPE′|Z=z − PKE′|Z=z‖1 ≤ ǫ ∀ z (9)
where for any vector Q, the L1-norm is ‖Q‖1 =∑
x |Q(x)|. Summarizing, for any ǫ > 0, there exists
a family of protocols parametrized by N , whose result
satisfy (8) and (9), and the rate tends to (5) asN grows.
3III. THE pi/3-PROTOCOL
The protocol described in this section is a variant of
the CHSH-protocol, and has the advantage that prov-
ing its security is simpler; additionally, it yields larger
key rates. This protocol shares some features with the
general scheme for QKD analyzed in [5]. Hence, for a
detailed account of these features we suggest consulting
this reference. The π/3-protocol consists of the follow-
ing six steps.
Measurements. Alice and Bob generate Xn and Yn
with distribution PXn(0) = PYn(0) = (1 − δ) for
n = 1, . . .N , where δ is a parameter that can
be chosen arbitrarily small as N grows. They
perform the measurements according to X and
Y , obtaining the outcomes A and B.
Symmetrization. This step is made in order to war-
rant that the distribution is almost product:
PAB|XY ≈ (PA1B1|X1Y1)⊗N . (10)
For this, the exponential de Finetti Repre-
sentation Theorem given in [5] is used. Al-
ice generates a random permutation of N
items, denoted π, and publicly announces it.
They make the transformation (an, bn, xn, yn)→
(aπ(n), bπ(n), xπ(n), yπ(n)) for n = 1, . . .N , and
discard the last Ns tuples (an, bn, xn, yn). The
safety parameter Ns will be specified below; the
important is that Ns grows sublinearly (Ns ≈√
N).
Parameter estimation. The honest parties use
a sufficiently large number Ne of tuples
of inputs/outcomes (an, bn, xn, yn) to es-
timate the values of B[PA1B1|X1Y1 ] and
H(A1|B1, X1=Y1=0) for a single pair. In






H(A1|B1, X1=Y1=0)P , (12)
where Γ is the set of single-copy distributions
PA1B1|X1Y1 compatible with the observed data,
up to a probability ǫ. The precise definition of
Γ can be found in [5]. This step can be done
through the public channel.
Basis reconciliation. Alice and Bob publicly an-
nounce the values xn and yn for the remaining
N − Ns − Ne tuples, and reject all the ones for
which xn = yn = 0 does not hold. The sur-
viving pairs of bits (an, bn) constitute the raw
key. Denote by N˜ the number of such pairs,
N˜ ≈ (1 − δ)2(N − Ns − Ne). For convenience,
we relabel these pairs with n = 1, . . . N˜ .
Information reconciliation. Alice picks a random
hash function F and announces it publicly. She
computes C = F (A) and sends to Bob the value
of C secretly. This consumes as much secret bits
as the length of the string C, which is N˜Hwc plus
some sublinear terms (see [5] for details). Bob
uses (C,F ) to correct the errors in his string B,
obtaining a string B′ which is equal to A with
high probability.
Privacy amplification. Alice picks a random hash
function G and communicates it secretly to Bob.
In order to consume few secret bits in the com-
munication of G, the alphabet of G must be
small. Hence, a two-universal class of hash func-
tions [5] is not suitable for this purpose. But
one can use the class of functions correspond-
ing to the “extractor” constructed in [13], whose
size is poly(log N˜ − log ǫ) bits. Then, only a
sublinear amount of secret bits are consumed in
this step, which does not modify the asymptotic
rate (5). Alice and Bob compute K = G(A)
and K ′ = G(B′), respectively, which constitute
their corresponding versions of the final key. The
length of K and K ′ is N˜(− logBwc) plus some
sublinear terms.
Because N˜ is equal to N plus sublinear terms in N ,
the length of the secret key obtained is N(− logBwc)
plus sublinear terms, and the length of the secret key
consumed is NHwc plus sublinear terms. Also, the
worst-case quantities Bwc and Hwc tend to the real ones
as more systems are consumed in the estimation step.
Summarizing, the rate at which net gain of secret key
is obtained tends to (5) as N grows.
Suppose Alice and Bob share many copies of the
noisy EPR state (7). The measurements that give
the maximal rate (5) are the followings. For Alice,
the directions in the Bloch sphere corresponding to
Xn = 0 and Xn = 1 are respectively (1, 0, 0) and
(cos π3 , sin
π
3 , 0). Whereas for Bob, the directions corre-
sponding to Yn = 0 and Yn = 1 are respectively (1, 0, 0)
and (cos π3 ,− sin π3 , 0). The rates obtained with this
setting are plotted in the figure.
IV. SECURITY PROOF
In this section we prove the security of the π/3-
protocol, explained in the previous section. For doing
so, we need to define the conditional maximum prob-













H∞(A|E)P ′ . (15)
In order to generate the secret key K from the partially
secret variable A, Alice uses an extractor [13]. The ex-
tractor produces a uniform secret string K of length
Hǫ∞(A|E′, X = Y = 0), where 0 denotes a string of N
zeros and E′ is all the information available to Eve. A
careful inspection shows that all the public messages
exchanged during the protocol are completely indepen-
dent of A. Hence, the relevant information in E′ is only
E. In order to obtain the security proof, we just have
to bound the quantity Hǫ∞(A|E,X = Y = 0). Notice
that the ǫ appearing here is not the same as in (8) and
(9); the relation between the two ǫ can be found in [5].
The next lemma is the core of the proof, where the
non-signaling constraint is imposed.
Lemma 1. Let PAB|XY be a 2N -partite non-
signalling distribution, then
Pmax(A|X=Y =0)P ≤ B[PAB|XY ]. (16)
Proof. Because of non-signaling, the marginal for A
is independent of Y , and inequality (16) is equivalent
to
PA|X=0(a) ≤ B[PAB|XY ] ∀ a ∈ {0, 1}N . (17)
Let us first show (17) for the case a = 0. The two
quantities in (17) are linear functions of the distri-
bution: B[PAB|XY ] = 〈B|PAB|XY 〉 and PA|X=0(0) =
〈M|PAB|XY 〉, where the components of |B〉 are (2), and




f [an, xn, yn], (18)
where f [m1, . . .mq] =
∏q
n=1 f [mn]. In vector notation,
the inequality we want to prove is(〈B| − 〈M|)|PAB|XY 〉 ≥ 0 . (19)
The only premise of Lemma 1 is that |PAB|XY 〉 is non-








PAB|XY (a1, 0, . . . , 0|1, 0, . . . , 0).
(20)
All these equalities can be written as 〈S|PAB|XY 〉 =
0, for some vectors |S〉. For example, the vector |S〉
corresponding to condition (20) has components
Sabxy = (−1)x1f [b1, y1]
N∏
n=2
f [an, bn, xn, yn]. (21)
We denote by S the set of all such vectors. The compo-
nents of the rest of vectors in S are obtained by taking
(21) and: (i) perform to any of the variables that ap-
pear in (21) the transformation m → m + 1, (ii) swap
the subindex 1 with any of the others 2, . . .N , and (iii)
exchange the roles of Alice and Bob. Given any linear
combination of vectors from S, say |S˜〉 =∑i σi|Si〉, we
have (〈B|−〈M|−〈S˜|)|PAB|XY 〉 = (〈B|−〈M|)|PAB|XY 〉.
In what follows, we obtain a linear combination of vec-
tors from S, denoted |S˜〉, such that all the components
of |B〉 − |M〉 − |S˜〉 are non-negative. Hence, any vec-
tor with positive entries |PAB|XY 〉 gives (〈B| − 〈M| −
〈S˜|)|PAB|XY 〉 ≥ 0. If additionally, |PAB|XY 〉 belongs
to the non-signalling subspace, this inequality is equiv-
alent to (19).
Denote by |B1〉 the vector with components(
5
8 − 12f [a1 + b1 + x1y1]
)
, then |B1〉⊗N = |B〉. Denote
by |M1〉 the vector with components





(−1)x1f [b1, y1]− 3
8




(−1)x1f [b1 + 1, y1] + 1
8
(−1)x1f [b1 + 1, y1 + 1]
−1
4
(−1)y1f [a1, x1 + 1] + 1
4
(−1)y1f [a1 + 1, x1 + 1].
Due to the form of (21), given an arbitrary ten-
sor, Ta2...aN b2...bNx2...xNy2...yN , there exists a linear
combination of vectors from S with components
(−1)x1f [b1, y1]Ta2...aN b2...bNx2...xNy2...yN . Then, one
can construct a linear combination |S˜〉, such that
|M〉+ |S˜〉 = |M1〉⊗N .
Denote by the components-wise inequality between
two vectors. Our aim is to prove that |B1〉⊗N 
|M1〉⊗N for any N . A complete inspection shows
that |B1〉  |M1〉. But this inequality also holds for
the component-wise absolute value of |M1〉, that is
|B1〉  ||M1〉|. This implies that when making tensor-
product powers of |B1〉 and |M1〉 the inequality still
holds. Therefore, all the components of |B〉−|M〉−|S˜〉
are non-negative for any N , and as argued above, this
proves (19).
Now, in order to finish the the proof of Lemma 1,
we show (17) for the remaining values a. Like when
a = 0, for the rest of values of a, there is a vector |Ma〉
such that PA|X=0(a) = 〈Ma|PABXY 〉. For any string
a′, the components of |Ma′〉 are like the ones in (18)
after the transformation (an, bn)→ (an + a′n, bn + a′n).
5This transformation is just a relabeling of the outcomes,
hence, when applied to |B〉 and |M〉, the transformed
inequality (19) still holds. Additionally, this transfor-
mation leaves the components of |B〉, defined in (1),
unchanged. Thus, for all a the inequality (17) is satis-
fied. 2
Lemma 2. Let PABXY E be the distribution for the
global correlations after the parameter estimation step,
and N ′ = N −Ns −Ne the number of pairs Alice and
Bob share. Let Bwc be the worst-case estimated value
for B[PA1B1|X1Y1 ], defined in (11). For any ǫ > 0 there
exists a distribution P ′′ABXY E satisfying both
‖P ′′ABXYE − PABXY E‖1 ≤ 2ǫ, (22)




where Ns = N
′α and α = 12 +
ln(8 ln 4/ǫ)
2 lnN ′ .
Proof. Let us use the short-hand notation C =
(A,B,X, Y ). All the correlations are contained in PCE ,
and PC is the honest parties’ marginal. The central tool
for proving this lemma is the classical version of the de
Finetti Representation Theorem given in [5]. According
to that result, for any positive integer Ns there exists
a distribution P ′C satisfying both














⊗(N ′−Ns) ⊗Q(Ns)[PC1 ]
]
, (25)
where sym[PABXY ] denotes the average over all permu-
tations of the N ′ pairs, dρ[PC1 ] is a probability mea-
sure over the set of single-copy distributions PC1 =
PA1B1X1Y1 , and Q
(Ns)
[PC1 ]
is an unknown Ns-pair distri-
bution which depends on PC1 . Obviously, the measure
ρ[PC1 ] is the one obtained from the data in the pa-
rameter estimation step. We chose Ns such that the
right-hand side of (24) is ǫ, for instance Ns = N
′α with
α = 12 +
ln(8 ln 4/ǫ)
2 lnN ′ . Let Γ be a set of single-copy dis-
tributions PC1 such that if we take the integration (25)







⊗N ′ ⊗Q(Ns)[PC1 ]
]
(26)
satisfies ‖P ′′C−P ′C‖1 ≤ ǫ. Because B is a linear function
symmetric on the pairs, we have





≤ BN ′−Nswc (5/2)Ns , (27)
because (5/2)Ns is the maximum value attained by B





C , which, by triangular inequality satisfies (22).
2
It is important to note that, the statement of Lemma
2 also holds for any subset of systems after the parame-
ter estimation step, with the proper rescaling of N ′ and
Ns. In particular, for the ones which constitute the raw
key (Xn = Yn = 0).
Lemma 3. Given a distribution PAE , for any ǫ > 0




Proof. Let PE be the marginal of PAE , and let P
′
E be
a distribution constructed in the following way. Take
PAE and reorder Eve’s outcomes e = 1, 2, . . . such that
the quantity maxa PAE(a, e) is monotonically decreas-
ing in e. Define e0 as the maximum integer such that∑e0−1
e=1 PE(e) ≤ ǫ/2. Assign





P ′E(e) = PE(e) for the rest. (31)
The distribution defined as P ′AE = PA|EP
′
E satisfies
















PA|E(a, e) ≤ Pmax(A|E)P , (32)
which after taking the logarithms, gives (28). 2
Theorem 4. Let PAE be the distribution after the
parameter estimation step, then for any ǫ > 0,
Hǫ∞(A|E,X=Y =0)P (33)






Proof. Let PABXY E be the distribution after the pa-
rameter estimation step, and P ′′ABXYE the distribution
which, according to Lemma 2, satisfies (22) and (23).
Using Lemma 1 and the linearity of B we get








P ′′E(e)B[P ′′AB|XY E=e] = B[P ′′AB|XY ].
This inequality together with Lemma 2 and 3 suffices
to finish the proof. 2
6V. THE CHSH-PROTOCOL
The method used to prove the security of the π/3-
protocol is very general, and can be applied to other
protocols. In this section we briefly describe the CHSH-
protocol, and indicate how to adapt the proof to it.
The CHSH-protocol is like the one described in sec-
tion III, but with some differences (see [8] for a detailed
explanation). The distribution for the measurements is
uniform, PXn(0) = PYn(0) = 1/2, Bob announces Y
publicly, and Alice keeps X secret. In the basis rec-
onciliation step all outcomes are used for the raw key,
independent of their corresponding inputs. Alice’s ver-
sion of the raw key is a′, where a′n = an ⊕ xnyn for
n = 1, . . .N , and Bob’s version is b. In this protocol,
the quantity that must be bound is the Renyi entropy
Hǫ∞(A
′|E, Y ), because Y is public. This can be done by
first getting a bound Pmax(A′|Y = y)P ≤ B˜(y)[PAB|XY ]
for all y ∈ {0, 1}N , where PAB|XY is any 2N -partite












where the y˜ in B˜(y˜) has a tilde in order not to confuse
it with the index y of the vector. When making the




2−N B˜(y)[PAB|XY ] = B′[PAB|XY ] ,









f [an + bn + xnyn]
)
.
Putting all things together, and making a similar argu-
ment, one obtains the rate formula
R = − logB′[PA1B1|X1Y1 ]−H(A′1|B1, Y1) , (35)
where A′1 = A1⊕X1Y1. When applying this formula to
the noisy EPR state (7), with the observables that max-
imize the CHSH violation, one obtains the rate plotted
in the figure.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results presented in this paper suggest that the
rates which are secure against non-signalling eavesdrop-
pers are smaller than the ones secure against quantum
eavesdroppers. We think that this is so because the
non-signalling assumption is weaker, and gives more
freedom to the eavesdropper. However, it is shown in
[14] that the protocol introduced in [10] gives a rate
of one secret bit per EPR pair, if only individual at-
tacks are considered. With the techniques introduced
here, one can show that the unit rate is also achievable
against general attacks. Clearly, this rate cannot be im-
proved by additionally assuming the whole of quantum
mechanics.
As can be seen in the figure, the rates which are se-
cure against individual attacks are usually larger than
the ones secure against general attacks. This could be
due to one of the following reasons: (i) individual at-
tacks are not optimal, or (ii), the rate formulae (5) and
(35) are not tight, and can be improved. This improve-
ment could follow from bounding a quantity different
than Pmax(A|E).
The security proof presented here has two defects:
(i) some of the public communication must be kept se-
cret, and (ii) the security is not universally composable.
In order to fix them, more knowledge about the non-
signaling extensions of the distribution (PA1B1|X1Y1)
N
to a third party is necessary. In our proof, the only
information used is the bound on Pmax(A|E) that all
such extensions must satisfy.
Summarizing, it was shown for the first time that
secure QKD can be implemented with positive rate,
under the sole assumption of no signaling. This is done
with the CHSH-protocol, which can be easily imple-
mented with present-day technology, and with the π/3-
protocol. Note that we go beyond the philosophy of [1]
in that there is still quantum mechanics, in particular
the validity of Tsirelson’s bound [15], is assumed. In
contrast, our approach is conceptually simpler in that
all we assume is no signalling. These results also con-
tribute to the understanding of quantum cryptography
where the honest users do not trust their apparatuses
[16].
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